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VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.  
 
Concerned about the consequences of a District Court 
order setting a 7.5 hour per side limit on the parties’ 
presentation of evidence at trial, the sixteen named defendants 
in this litigation (the “Lemington Defendants”) seek a writ of 
mandamus to vacate the time- limit order.2
 
  Because we 
believe that a direct appeal presents an adequate means for 
the Lemington Defendants to challenge the District Court’s 
order, we will deny the petition for a writ of mandamus. 
I. 
 
 The Lemington Home for the Aged (the “Home”) is a 
non-profit nursing care facility in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.  
Beginning in the 1980’s, the Home faced a series of 
escalating financial difficulties, eventually culminating in the 
Home ceasing to admit new patients and filing a Chapter 11 
bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for 
the Western District of Pennsylvania in 2005.  The 
Bankruptcy Court appointed a Committee of Unsecured 
                                              
 2 Although this petition’s caption includes nineteen 
named defendants, the parties state that there are presently 
only sixteen named defendants.  
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Creditors (the “Committee”), approved closure of the Home, 
and authorized the Committee to commence adversary 
proceedings against the Home’s officers and directors in the 
District Court.   
 
 On August 27, 2007, the Committee filed its second 
amended complaint on behalf of the debtor, asserting causes 
of action against the Lemington Defendants—former officers 
and directors of the Home—for breach of their fiduciary 
duties of care and loyalty and for deepening insolvency.  The 
District Court granted summary judgment to the Lemington 
Defendants, holding that the business judgment rule and the 
doctrine of in pari delicto precluded the Committee’s breach 
of fiduciary duty claims, and that the Committee failed to 
show fraud sufficient to support a deepening insolvency 
claim.  We vacated the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment and remanded for trial.  See Official Comm. of 
Unsecured Creditors ex rel. Estate of Lemington Home for 
the Aged v. Baldwin (In re Lemington Home for the Aged), 
659 F.3d 282, 285 (3d Cir. 2011).   
 
 Following remand, the District Court issued an order 
on October 31, 2011, scheduling jury selection and trial for 
December 5, 2011.  The District Court also scheduled a 
preliminary pre-trial conference for November 22, 2011 and a 
final pretrial conference for December 1, 2011.   
 
 Before the November 22, 2011 preliminary pretrial 
conference, the parties stipulated to fourteen facts and 
identified approximately 400 proposed exhibits.  The parties 
also submitted proposed witness lists.  The Committee stated 
that it intended to call up to fifty-one witnesses, and the 
Lemington Defendants stated that they intended to call up to 
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thirty-four witnesses.  The Lemington Defendants’ witness 
list included twenty definite witnesses and fourteen standby 
witnesses.  Of the definite witnesses, five were expert 
witnesses and fifteen were fact witnesses.  The Lemington 
Defendants’ descriptions of many of their witnesses’ intended 
testimony were similar.  For example, the Lemington 
Defendants indicated that six of their definite director 
witnesses intended to testify as to their responsibilities to the 
Home and the reasons for the decision to cease admitting new 
residents to the Home and to file for bankruptcy in 2005.   
 
 On November 22, 2011, the District Court held a 
preliminary pretrial conference, during which it expressed 
frustration with what it viewed as the parties’ failure to 
“streamline [the] case.”  (Lemington Defendants’ Pet. at 31.)  
In particular, the District Court noted that “[t]he duplication 
of witnesses [was] overwhelming,” and that the parties 
appeared “unwilling[] to stipulate to the most basic facts.”  
(Id.)  Explaining that it would not allow the parties to force 
the “jury [to] sit through endless repetitive testimony,” the 
District Court limited each side’s witness testimony to 7.5 
hours and limited the parties’ opening and closing statements 
to half an hour per side per statement.  (Id.)  In total, the 
District Court allowed each side 8.5 hours to present their 
cases.   
 
 The Lemington Defendants objected to the District 
Court’s time-limit order, explaining that they did not believe 
that 8.5 hours was adequate time to present their case.  The 
District Court responded that it viewed the expert testimony 
and exhibits as excessive and the fact witnesses as redundant.  
It did, however, offer the Lemington Defendants the option of 
extending their opening and closing time to forty minutes, if 
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they divided their opening and closing time between the 
officers and the directors.  It thus extended the Lemington 
Defendants’ total possible presentation time to eight hours 
and fifty minutes.   
 
 Following the November 22, 2011 conference, the 
parties stipulated to ten additional facts.  The Lemington 
Defendants also added an additional definite witness to their 
witness list, and provided a supplemental list of thirty-seven 
possible creditor witnesses to testify regarding damages.  The 
thirty-seven creditor witnesses were almost entirely 
custodian-of-records witnesses.   
 
 The Lemington Defendants also moved for 
reconsideration of the District Court’s trial time-limit order, 
contending that they did not have warning that the District 
Court would impose such a short time limit, and that the time 
allotted to them was insufficient to present their case.  The 
Lemington Defendants instead estimated that the trial would 
likely require a total of approximately sixteen days, or eight 
days per side.  
 
 The District Court held the final pretrial conference on 
December 2, 2011. Addressing the Lemington Defendants’ 
motion for reconsideration, the District Court observed that, 
in view of its well-settled practice of trying cases “on the 
clock,” the parties had fair warning that a time limit would be 
imposed.  The District Court also expressed disappointment 
that the parties had not cooperated with each other since the 
November 22, 2011 conference, and reiterated that “[i]t’s 
unfair to our jurors to bring them in here and just put witness 
after witness on the stand with repetitive testimony.”  
(Lemington Defendants’ Pet. at 89.)  The District Court 
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concluded that it “would have been willing to give [the 
parties] a little more time or at least talk to [them] about [the 
time-limit order] if [they] had followed [its] suggestions,” but 
because they did not “work with [the District Court] . . . [the 
District Court will] not . . . give [the parties] 16 days to try the 
case.”  (Id. at 97.)  The District Court offered, however, to 
stay the trial and to certify the time-limit issue for appeal.   
 
 Based on the District Court’s order certifying the time-
limit issue for appeal, the Lemington Defendants petitioned 
for permission to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and, in 
the alternative, for a writ of mandamus.  We dismissed the 
petition to appeal under § 1292(b) because the District Court 
did not certify that the time-limit order “involve[d] a 
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial 
ground for difference of opinion” pursuant to § 1292(b).  We 





 We have authority to issue a writ of mandamus under 
28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), which permits “[t]he Supreme Court and 
all courts established by Act of Congress [to] issue all writs 
necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective 
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of 
law.”3
                                              
3 Because 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) allows us to issue writs 
of mandamus “in aid of” our jurisdiction, “the case must be 
one that lies within ‘some present or potential exercise of 
appellate jurisdiction.’”  Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. 
Republic of Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1422 (3d Cir. 1991) 
  The writ of mandamus is available exclusively in 
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“exceptional circumstances.”  Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 
90, 95 (1967) (citing De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United 
States, 325 U.S. 212, 217 (1945)).  We ordinarily may issue 
“the writ only to confine inferior courts to their lawful 
jurisdiction or to compel them to exercise authority when they 
have a duty to do so.”  De Masi v. Weiss, 669 F.2d 114, 117 
(3d Cir. 1982) (citing Will, 389 U.S. at 95).  To obtain 
mandamus relief, “the petitioner must establish both that there 
is (1) ‘no other adequate means’ to attain the relief sought, 
and (2) a right to the writ that is ‘clear and indisputable.’”  In 
re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 212 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Cheney 
v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004)).  Even if the 
petitioner satisfies both prerequisites, our decision to issue the 
writ remains discretionary.  Id.   
 
 The Lemington Defendants argue that their right to the 
writ is clear and indisputable because the time-limit order is a 
clear abuse of discretion, and that they have no other adequate 
means to obtain relief because “without the granting of the 
Writ, [the Lemington Defendants’] pleas for adequate time to 
present their case at trial will go unheard, and there will be no 
way to rectify the harm imposed by the district court’s time 
limitations prior to the time set for trial.”  (Lemington 
Defendants’ Pet. at 17.)  In particular, the Lemington 
Defendants emphasize that immediate review is necessary 
because, if the Lemington Defendants can appeal only after 
                                                                                                     
(quoting Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 591 (3d 
Cir. 1984)).  This case is within the exercise of our potential 
appellate jurisdiction because the District Court had 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1334(b), and we 
may obtain jurisdiction after the District Court enters final 
judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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the District Court enters final judgment, “the appellate court 
[will] be asked to speculate on the defenses that [the 
Lemington Defendants] intended to present and to re-
construct the case that [the Lemington Defendants] intended 
to set forth.”  (Lemington Defendants’ Reply Br. at 14.)  They 
also contend that the District Court’s time-limit order 
“violates due process and has in effect denied . . . their right 
to a jury trial, thus, justifying mandamus relief under the 




 The “no other adequate means” requirement to 
mandamus relief “emanates from the final judgment rule,” 
which ordinarily requires the parties to await the district 
court’s entry of final judgment before seeking appellate 
review.  In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 
379 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. 
Republic of Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1422 (3d Cir. 1991)); see 
also In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d at 212 (“An appellate court’s 
overuse of the writ to review interlocutory district court 
decisions would undermine the Congressional policy against 
piecemeal appeals.”).  In accordance with our respect for the 
final judgment rule, “a writ of mandamus should not be 
issued where relief may be obtained through an ordinary 
appeal.”  In re Chambers Dev. Co., 148 F.3d 214, 223 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (quoting Hahnemann Univ. Hosp. v. Edgar, 74 
F.3d 456, 461 (3d Cir. 1996)). 
 
 Assuming that the Lemington Defendants lose at trial, 
they will be able to appeal the District Court’s time-limit 
order following the entry of final judgment.  See, e.g., 
Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 
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604, 611 (3d Cir. 1995) (reviewing a district court’s trial 
time-limit order).  Although we appreciate that postponing 
review until after the District Court enters final judgment may 
increase litigation costs by forcing the parties to try this case 
under conditions that possibly constitute reversible error, 
“adverse interlocutory rulings . . . [that] increase the cost of 
litigation, cause inconvenience, or result in unanticipated 
delay . . . typically do not . . . warrant the extraordinary step 
of mandamus intervention.”  In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d at 214 
(citations omitted); see also Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, 
Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36 (1980) (a litigant has other adequate 
means to challenge a district court’s order for a new trial in 
part because “[a] litigant is free to seek review of the 
propriety of such an order on direct appeal”).  Moreover, the 
Lemington Defendants may win at trial, thereby avoiding our 
need to address their challenge to the time-limit order 
altogether. 
 
 We are not persuaded by the Lemington Defendants’ 
argument that they may have difficulty demonstrating on 
appeal how the time-limit order caused them prejudice at 
trial.  Although the Lemington Defendants are correct that the 
time-limit order will not be reversible error if the record 
indicates that it caused no prejudice at trial, the Lemington 
Defendants’ possible need to show prejudice is no different 
than the burden on most litigants appealing purported trial 
errors.  See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co., 66 F.3d at 611 
(“[D]espite our concern about the district court’s [time-limit 
decision], we will not reverse because we are unable to 
conclude that its ruling had any impact on the outcome of the 
case.”).  Indeed, the fact that the Lemington Defendants may 
be unable to show prejudice at trial suggests that their right to 
relief is not clear and indisputable, a sine qua non of 
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mandamus relief.  In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d at 212.  
Accordingly, the Lemington Defendants’ potential difficulty 
in demonstrating prejudice at trial militates against granting 




 We also reject the Lemington Defendants’ argument 
that we may grant mandamus relief on the grounds that the 
District Court’s time limit “has in effect denied [them] their 
right to a jury trial.”  (Lemington Defendants’ Reply Br. at 
13.)  The Lemington Defendants correctly assert that writs of 
mandamus have issued to protect the right to a jury trial.  See, 
e.g., Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 511 (1959) 
(“[W]e think the right to grant mandamus to require [a] jury 
trial where it has been improperly denied is settled.”); 
Eldredge v. Gourley, 505 F.2d 769, 770 (3d Cir. 1974) 
(granting a writ of mandamus to protect the right to a jury 
trial while the district court action remained pending); see 
also Maloney v. Plunkett, 854 F.2d 152, 154 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(noting that the Supreme Court has suggested that “a less 
stringent test [for mandamus] might be proper where the 
challenged ruling ha[s] infringed [on] the right to [a] jury 
trial”); Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co. (In re Golden), 73 F.3d 
648, 658 (6th Cir. 1996) (“Where the constitutional right to a 
jury trial is involved, . . . some courts . . . have held that 
neither of the[] two preconditions [to mandamus relief] needs 
to be met.”) (citations omitted).   
 
 The unsound premise of the Lemington Defendants’ 
argument is that the time-limit order deprives them of their 
right to a jury trial.  In fact, the order does not preclude 




 To avoid the indisputable fact that their right to a jury 
trial remains intact, the Lemington Defendants suggest that if 
mandamus relief is permissible prior to final judgment to 
protect the right vel non to a jury trial, then it is also 
permissible prior to final judgment to ensure “a fair jury 
trial.”  (Lemington Defendants’ Pet. at 18.)  Because the 
District Court’s time-limit order does not, in the Lemington 
Defendants’ view, provide adequate time for them to present 
their defenses, they assert that the time-limit order violates 
their right to a fair trial before a jury, and that they therefore 
may obtain mandamus relief before trial, regardless of the 
availability of relief after final judgment. 
 
 The Lemington Defendants’ attempt to shoehorn a fair 
trial claim into a jury trial claim for which mandamus review 
may lie is unavailing.  There is simply no basis for us to 
conclude that the time-limit order has the effect of depriving 
the parties of a jury trial.  Nor can we decide ex ante that the 
effect of the time-limit order is so draconian and such a 
mockery of the trial process as to amount to no trial at all.  It 
may be that, in this case, the time-limit order is found to be 
reversible error.  But that determination must await the 
presentation of a record that identifies with precision the 
evidence that the Lemington Defendants were unable to 
present because the trial judge’s clock ran out.  To hold 
otherwise would invite parties to seek mandamus relief 
whenever they are “placed on the clock,” requiring appellate 
courts to hazard guesses as to whether an impact of a time-
limit order is so severe as to deprive a party of the right to a 
“fair” jury trial.  We decline to endorse such use of the 




 Notably, we have recognized that a district court may 
impose limits on the parties’ presentation time at trial, so long 
as the court both “mak[es] an informed analysis based on a 
review of the parties’ proposed witness lists and proffered 
testimony” and “allocates trial time evenhandedly.”  
Duquesne Light Co., 66 F.3d at 610.  Other circuits have 
likewise concluded that a district court may, in its discretion, 
set reasonable trial time limits.  See, e.g., United States v. 
DeCologero, 364 F.3d 12, 25 (1st Cir. 2004) (“[L]imits on 
witnesses and the time allowed to each side are permissible 
measures.”) (citations omitted); Deus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 15 
F.3d 506, 520 (5th Cir. 1994) (“In the management of its 
docket, the court has an inherent right to place reasonable 
limitations on the time allotted to any given trial.”) (citing 
United States v. Reaves, 636 F. Supp. 1575, 1577 (E.D. Ky. 
1986)); Sutkiewicz v. Monroe Cnty. Sheriff, 110 F.3d 352, 361 
(6th Cir. 1997) (“[A] district court has broad discretion to 
place limits on the presentation of evidence to prevent delay, 
waste of time, and needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence.”) (citing Duquesne Light Co., 66 F.3d at 609); MCI 
Commc’ns Corp., 708 F.2d at 1172-73 (holding that 
reasonable trial time limits do not violate the right to a fair 
trial); Johnson v. Ashby, 808 F.2d 676, 678 (8th Cir. 1987) 
(“Trial courts have discretion to place reasonable limits on the 
presentation of evidence . . . .”) (citations omitted); Gen. 
Signal Corp. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 66 F.3d 1500, 1508 
(9th Cir. 1995) (“Generally, a district court may impose 
reasonable time limits on a trial.”) (citations omitted).   
 
 Whether a District Court has abused its discretion in 
setting and administering a time-limit order is best addressed 
after trial, with a reviewing court able to assess a record that 
shows what was presented to the jury and what a party was 
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unable to present.  Only then may an informed decision be 
made as to whether a party was denied a fair trial.4
 
   
 In denying mandamus relief, we emphasize that we are 
not ruling on the propriety of the time-limit order.  We 
appreciate that this is a complex case, that the Committee has 
sued sixteen individual defendants, and that many of the 
defendants may need to testify to present their own defenses, 
even if some of their testimony is duplicative.  Because 7.5 
hours may ultimately be too little time for the Lemington 
Defendants to adequately present their case, we do not 
conclude that the time-limit order is permissible or valid.  We 
hold only that a post-judgment appeal is adequate to assure 
meaningful review of the propriety of the time-limit order.5
                                              
 4 The Lemington Defendants have not cited any case 
where an appellate court has held before trial that a time-limit 
order deprived a party of a fair trial.  
 
 5 It is difficult to conceive how either side in this 
complex case could possibly present the necessary evidence 
to a jury in 7.5 hours of trial time.  Although the Committee 
has not sought immediate review of the time-limit order, it 
did make clear at oral argument that it was not willing to 
concede that the order was a proper exercise of discretion.  
Instead, the Committee asserted that it was not waiving its 
right to challenge the time-limit order if it does not prevail at 
trial.  It is also difficult to understand the District Court’s 
rationale in allocating to the entire defense side of the case 
7.5 hours of evidence presentation time given the fact that 
there may be different liability rules and defenses applicable 
to defendants who were members of the board of directors 
versus defendants who were officers of the non-profit entity.  






 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for 
a writ of mandamus. 
                                                                                                     
care for directors of a nonprofit corporation) with 15 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5712(c) (standard of care for officers of a 
nonprofit corporation).  We therefore urge the District Court 
to re-examine the time-limit order to avoid the necessity of a 
re-trial.  We trust that if, at any time, the District Court is 
persuaded that any time limits it has set are not sufficient to 
allow for a fair presentation of the case, the Court will take 
appropriate steps to see that due process is satisfied. 
